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Abstract We address the relationship between educational attainment and radical
right voting (i.e., voting for the PVV) in the Netherlands. We tested whether lower
educated people are overrepresented among the electorate of the PVV – as often found
in earlier research – and considered underlying explanations for this relationship. Using
data derived from the Religion in Dutch Society (SOCON, 2011/2012) survey, we were
able to empirically test a set of innovative mediators (e.g., interethnic contact,
euroscepticism, associational involvement and social trust) simultaneously next to
theoretically well-established mediators (e.g., perceived ethnic threat, nationalistic
attitudes and authoritarianism). Our results indicated that lower educated people are
more likely to cast their vote for the PVV than higher educated people, due to their level
of perceived ethnic threat, anti-Muslim attitudes and authoritarianism. Using boot-
strapping, only ethnic threat perceptions turned out to significantly mediate the rela-
tionship between educational attainment and radical right voting, ruling out many other
explanations. Our findings underline the importance of precluding spurious influences
when addressing radical right voting and show that radical right parties’ emphasis on the
economic and cultural threats that immigrants would pose for Western societies seems
to bear fruit in terms of mobilizing lower educated people, at least among the Dutch
electorate.
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Introduction
The proposition that education, next to social class, is an important predictor of
political preferences and voting behaviour was already introduced by Lipset back in
1960 (Lipset, 1981 [1960]). As many Western countries faced rising levels of
support for radical right parties during recent decades (Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren,
2007), scholars became increasingly interested in the question whether education
also influences people’s likelihood to vote for political parties at the extreme right
end of the political spectrum (e.g., Betz, 1993; Lubbers et al, 2002; Norris, 2005;
Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013). Generally, results indicate that lower educated
people are consistently overrepresented among the electorate of radical right parties
in Europe (e.g., Lubbers et al, 2002; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Ford and
Goodwin, 2010; Werts et al, 2012; Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013). However, some
studies failed to find a significant relationship between educational attainment and
radical right voting (e.g., Norris, 2005), or showed that in particular the mid-school
stratum is most likely to vote for radical right parties (Evans, 2005; Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; see also Rydgren, 2007).1
In this study, we will address the relationship between natives’ educational
attainment and radical right voting in the Netherlands. Radical right parties are
considered to share important characteristics such as nativism, authoritarianism and
populism (Mudde, 2007), focusing on anti-immigrant issues as their core message
(Rydgren, 2007). In the Netherlands, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for
Freedom; PVV) has been denoted as a radical right party in several expert surveys
(2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey; Expert Judgement Survey of European Political
Parties 2010), and support for this party has been studied repeatedly in previous
research on radical right voting (e.g., Werts et al, 2012; Van der Waal et al, 2013;
Van Gent et al, 2014; Stockemer, 2015).2 The PVV has an ethnocentric agenda
favouring a tough immigration policy as well as assimilation (see 2006 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey) and is – according to the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance – in particular, vocal in ‘‘[…] resorting to racist and xenophobic
discourse, targeting above all Muslim communities’’ (ECRI, 2008, p. 35). In the
last two general elections of 2010 and 2012, the PVV attracted 15 and 10 per cent
of the votes, respectively.
We start with the question whether lower educated natives are, indeed, more
likely to vote for the radical right (i.e., PVV), as found by many, but not all,
previous studies. More important, however, is the question why people’s level of
educational attainment would predict their likelihood to vote for the PVV. Phrased
more formally: which are the decisive explanatory mechanisms that mediate the
relationship between educational attainment and voting for the radical right in the
Netherlands in recent times?
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Only a limited number of explanatory mechanisms for the relationship between
educational attainment and radical right voting has been put to an empirical test so
far, if earlier studies addressed underlying explanations at all. Therefore, we will
focus on a wide variety of explanations for the relationship, explicating underlying
theoretical explanations more elaborately and we simultaneously consider previous
consistent empirical patterns. These explanations share rather consistently that they
focus on political stances, e.g., anti-immigration or eurosceptic stances, ranking
high on the political agenda of radical right parties as well as being supported by
lowly educated people, or they focus on lack of societal connectedness (e.g., in
terms of associational involvement or contact with ethnic minorities) that could
reduce these political stances.
We will consider explanations proposed more recently and innovatively, e.g., on
interethnic contact (e.g., Rydgren, 2008), associational involvement (e.g., Rydgren,
2009), social trust (cf. Norris, 2005) and euroscepticism (e.g., Werts et al, 2012),
next to previously established explanations, e.g., perceptions of ethnic threat (e.g.,
Norris, 2005), nationalism (e.g., Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000), or authoritarianism
(e.g., Mayer and Perrineau, 1992). Using recent high quality data from the Religion
in Dutch Society survey (Eisinga et al, 2012), we are – unlike earlier research –
able to take into account these different explanations simultaneously. This allows
us to conduct a more strict, systematic and rigorous test of the driving factors
behind the relationship between education and radical right voting, ruling out
possibilities of spurious influences and eventually assessing crucial determinants.
Theories and Hypotheses
Before we will consider underlying explanations for the relationship between
educational attainment and voting for the PVV, we will first formulate a hypothesis
on the direct relationship between educational attainment and radical right voting.
As argued above, results from previous research generally show that lower
educated people are overrepresented among the electorate of radical right parties in
the Netherlands as well as other European countries (e.g., Werts et al, 2012;
Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013). In line with these empirical findings we formulate
our first (starting) hypothesis which reads: (H1) Lower educated people are more
likely to vote for the PVV than higher educated people.3
Intergroup contact theory
A recent line of explanation for the relationship between education and radical right
voting is related to out-group derogation and can be derived from intergroup
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contact theory (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). The influence of
interethnic contact on radical right voting has been repeatedly proposed (e.g., Biggs
and Knauss, 2012; Van der Paauw and Flache, 2012; Van der Waal et al, 2013).
However, only in two studies so far has this relationship been put to an empirical
test (Rydgren, 2008; Green et al, 2016). According to contact theory, having
positive interethnic contact effectively reduces out-group derogation, due to
increased levels of knowledge, empathy and perspective taking as well as reduced
anxiety (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). People with less interethnic contact and
consequently higher levels of out-group derogation, might be more likely to vote
for radical right parties, persistently claiming to serve interests of native people
with anti-immigration stances. Green et al, (2016) revealed a negative influence of
interethnic contact on radical right voting in Switzerland, however, Rydgren (2008)
found mixed evidence across six European countries. Since previous research
shows that lower educated natives are less likely to have interethnic friendships
(e.g., Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Savelkoul et al, 2015), this might explain why
they are overrepresented among radical right voters: they are more likely to support
strong anti-immigrant stances (e.g., Hello et al, 2002). Hence, we expect that:
(H2a) Lower educated people have less interethnic contact than higher educated
people and (H2b) having interethnic contact is negatively related with the
likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Social integration and schools of democracy
A second line of explanation can be traced back to the work of Putnam and
Tocquevillian theories of social capital. The core proposition is that involvement in
voluntary organizations (e.g., sports clubs, social clubs, humanitarian organiza-
tions), which are far removed from the political sphere, as yet promote cooperative
behaviour, interpersonal trust and social tolerance (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Norris,
2005; Van der Meer and Van Ingen, 2009). As voluntary associations are
considered to be places where civic and social skills are learned, they are often
described as ‘schools of democracy’. Only a few studies have tested this influence
empirically, showing that people who are involved in voluntary organizations have
less sympathy for radical right parties (e.g., Billiet and De Witte, 2001; Coffe´,
2002; however, see also Rydgren, 2009). Norris (2005) was particularly interested
in the influence of social trust in this respect. Based on data of eight European
countries, she found that people with higher levels of social trust are less likely to
cast their vote for a radical right party. Vice versa, earlier studies have shown that
lower educated people are generally less likely to be involved in voluntary
organizations, hence, lacking exposure to these schools of democracy and
displaying lower levels of social trust as compared to higher educated people
(e.g., Putnam, 1995; Wilson, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Therefore, we
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hypothesize that: (H3a) Lower educated people are less likely to be involved in
voluntary organizations and (H4a) have less social trust than higher educated
people. In addition, (H3b) involvement in voluntary organizations, as well as (H4b)
social trust are negatively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Euroscepticism
Many radical right parties in Europe have a critical stance towards the European
Union, as political and cultural European integration conflicts with their core
ideology that European national cultures have the right to protect their cultural
identity (Rydgren, 2007). Supranational identities, such as the European Union, are
considered a threat to national identity, particularly by radial right parties. The EU,
and Brussels as its symbolic capital, is therefore strongly distrusted in the radical
right’s rhetoric, as it is expected to take over national sovereignty (Werts et al,
2012). In recent years, scholars showed that radical right parties are successful in
attracting votes among the eurosceptic electorate (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Van der Brug
et al, 2005; Werts et al, 2012). As lower educated people turn out to be more
eurosceptic (e.g., Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Hakhverdian et al, 2013), this
might offer a different explanation for the relationship between educational
attainment and radical right voting. In sum, we expect that: (H5a) Lower educated
people are more eurosceptic than higher educated people and (H5b) higher levels
of euroscepticism are positively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Ethnic competition theory
Other, more established explanations can be derived from realistic group conflict
theory (Coser, 1956; Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999) and ethnic competition theory
(Scheepers et al, 2002; Coenders et al, 2004), related to competition between ethnic
out-groups and one’s ethnic in-group. According to this line of reasoning, natives
compete with ethnic minorities with regard to scarce resources (e.g., jobs or
affordable housing) and conflicting values. The presence of ethnic minorities is
expected to trigger perceptions of ethnic threat among natives – particularly among
deprived people among the ethnic majority group in similar social positions as ethnic
minorities – which, in turn, increase levels of out-group derogation (Scheepers et al,
2002; Coenders et al, 2004). As radical right parties generally have a strong anti-
immigrant stance (in particular with regard to immigrants from Muslim countries)
(e.g., Zaslove, 2004; Rydgren, 2007), they can effectively mobilize these deprived
voters who perceive ethnic competition and/or hold negative attitudes toward ethnic
minorities and Muslims in particular. Earlier research has repeatedly shown indeed
that perceptions of ethnic threat as well as negative attitudes towards ethnic
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minorities are strong predictors of radical right voting (e.g., Norris, 2005; Werts et al,
2012) which are particularly strongly present among lowly educated people (e.g.,
Hello et al, 2002; Schneider, 2008). Summarizing, we hypothesize that: (H6a) Lower
educated people perceive more ethnic threat and (H7a) display higher levels of anti-
Muslim attitudes than higher educated people. Moreover, higher levels of (H6b)
ethnic threat perceptions as well as (H7b) anti-Muslim attitudes are positively
related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Perceptions of ethnic threat not only trigger out-group derogation, but also drive
nationalistic attitudes (Scheepers et al, 2002; Coenders et al, 2004). According to
Rydgren (2007, p. 242), radical right parties ‘‘[…] share an emphasis on ethno-
nationalism’’ having programs ‘‘[…] directed toward strengthening the nation by
making it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values’’. For
several Western European countries, evidence was found for a positive relationship
between nationalistic attitudes and voting for radical right parties (e.g., Lubbers and
Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers et al, 2000). As earlier studies also showed that lower
educated people hold more nationalistic attitudes than higher educated people (Hjerm,
2001; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003), this offers another alternative explanation for
the negative relationship between educational attainment and voting for the radical
right. Therefore, we expect that: (H8a) Lower educated people display higher levels of
nationalistic attitudes than higher educated people and (H8b) higher levels of
nationalistic attitudes are positively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Psychological interests
The classic explanation we cannot neglect for the overrepresentation of lower
educated people among the electorate of radical right parties, is based on Adorno
and colleagues’ monumental study of the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al,
1950). This explanation boils down to the idea that the socio-economic position of
the lower strata, i.e., those with low educational credits, is characterized by poverty
and deprivation, which, in turn, fosters frustration and anxiety. To deal with this,
lower strata are likely to submit themselves to strong authorities and conventional
norms and values (Scheepers et al, 1990), i.e., support authoritarianism. As radical
right parties emphasize the role of the strong leader as well as traditional norms,
they are able to serve these psychological needs (Mudde, 2007). Empirical
evidence for the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and radical right
voting is mixed. Whereas some studies found support for the positive influence of
authoritarianism (e.g., Mayer and Perrineau, 1992; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000),
more recent and rigorous studies did not (e.g., Werts et al, 2012). As yet, we
formulate the following hypothesis: (H9a) Lower educated people are more in
favour of authoritarian attitudes than higher educated people and (H9b) having
authoritarian attitudes is positively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
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Relative deprivation and losers of modernization thesis
Another alternative explanation for a negative relationship between educational
attainment and voting for the radical right can be found in theoretical notions of
relative deprivation jointly with the losers of modernization thesis (e.g., Betz, 1994;
Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007). According to this line of reasoning, lower educated
people are considered to lack necessary skills like cultural capital, individual
entrepreneurship and flexibility to be able to cope with the rapidly changing socio-
economic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies.
This translates into higher chances to get stuck in full or partial unemployment. As
a consequence, lower educated people run the risk of forming a new underclass of
‘losers of modernization’ and becoming ‘‘[…] superfluous and useless for society’’
(Betz, 1994, p. 32), which might be reflected in uncertain present economic
situations as well as uncertainty about future economic prospects. This links with
relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Meyer, 2004), which
focuses on feelings of relative deprivation and frustration arising from uncertain
present and future economic prospects. Disappointing comparisons with one’s own
past or with social reference groups can induce such feelings of relative deprivation
(Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970). According to Rydgren (2007, p. 248) ‘‘the
ethnonationalistically defined, homogeneous community and the virtue of
traditional roles stressed by the new radical right constitute appealing counter-
weights for people who do not feel at home in a modernizing society’’. Earlier
research often considered relative deprivation in terms of declining economic
situations or fear of economic decline in the future (Rydgren, 2007), i.e., similarly
to theoretical notions on losers of modernization. Based on these theoretical
notions, we expect that particularly lower educated people are likely to face relative
economic deprivation, which explains why they are more likely to vote for the
radical right. Hence, we propose that: (H10a) Lower educated people are more
likely to face relative deprivation than higher educated people, and (H10b) relative
deprivation is positively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Protest vote
The final explanation we consider for the negative relationship between educational
attainment and radical right voting is based on the idea that radical right parties
gain from political protest. According to this line of reasoning, voting for radical
right parties is driven by political dissatisfaction or distrust rather than being
attracted by the anti-immigrant stances of these parties (Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde,
2007). Although political distrust might not be the single reason to vote for the
radical right, earlier studies showed that it does influence people’s likelihood of
voting for such parties (e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2005; Werts et al, 2012). As previous
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research has shown that lower educated people generally display lower levels of
trust in politics (e.g., Cole, 1973; Schoon et al, 2010), this might be another
explanation for the relationship between educational attainment and radical right
voting. Summarizing, we expect that: (H11a) Lower educated people display lower
levels of political trust than higher educated people and (H11b) political trust is
negatively related with the likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Interrelatedness explanations
The theoretical model explaining why lower educated people are overrepresented
among the electorate of radical right parties might be (even) more complex than
discussed so far, as several mechanisms themselves might be interrelated as well.
According to ethnic competition theory and several studies in the field (e.g.,
Coenders et al, 2004; Pettigrew et al, 2010) perceptions of ethnic threat induce both
out-group derogation as well as nationalistic attitudes. Moreover, we know from
earlier studies that interethnic contact is negatively related with ethnic threat
perceptions and out-group derogation (e.g., Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011; Pettigrew
et al, 2010). Also other explanations might be related: according to the idea of
‘schools of democracy’, associational involvement is linked to tolerance and social
trust (e.g., Putnam, 2000; Norris, 2005), whereas relative deprivation might trigger
authoritarian attitudes (cf. Scheepers et al, 1990). Given the cross-sectional nature
of our data, it is, unfortunately, impossible to take into account and further
disentangle the (causal) orders of these theoretical mechanisms. Considering our
alternative (and sometimes related) explanations simultaneously enables us,
however, to conduct a more strict test, revealing the most crucial mechanisms.
We will come back to this in our discussion section.
Data and Measurements
We used data from the Religion in Dutch Society (SOCON, 2011/2012; Eisinga
et al, 2012) survey, which offers the unique possibility to consider a large number
of underlying explanations for the relationship between educational attainment and
radical right voting in the Netherlands. The target population of this survey are
Dutch citizens aged between 18 and 70. A two-step random sample was applied.
First, a random sample of addresses was drawn from the full registry of postal
codes. Next, at the address, a so-called ‘last birthday rule’ was applied to select the
respondent who would be invited to take part in this survey. The fieldwork was
conducted between September 2011 and February 2012 by an external fieldwork
organization under the direction of Radboud University Nijmegen.4 We only
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included native Dutch respondents (86.1 per cent) which resulted in a dataset with
856 respondents. Unless stated differently, respondents with missing values on one
or more variables were excluded (9.6 per cent), resulting in a working sample of
774 respondents.
Support for the PVV
To measure radical right voting in the Netherlands, we used an item of the
respondents’ intended voting behaviour: ‘Which party would you vote for if
parliamentary elections were held today?’. As only respondents aged 18 years and
over are included in the survey, all respondents are legally allowed to cast their
vote in parliamentary elections. The answer categories consist of the ten largest
political parties represented in the Dutch parliament as well as the option ‘another
party’. Respondents who answered ‘I don’t know’ (9 per cent) and ‘no answer’ (.4
per cent) were excluded from the analyses. Respondents who answered that they
would not vote, were included in the reference category, as were respondents who
indicated to vote for another party than the PVV.5 In total, 8.4 per cent of the
respondents in our working sample indicated that they would vote for the PVV.6
This is slightly lower as compared to the parliamentary elections in 2012 in which
10.1 per cent voted for the PVV. Note, however, that respondents who do not know
what party they would vote for are excluded, while it is likely that some of these
respondents eventually vote for the PVV as well.
Educational attainment
To measure educational attainment, respondents were asked about the highest
level of education they had completed after elementary school. For reasons of
parsimony, we included a continuous measure of educational attainment based on
the number of years necessary to complete the different levels of education. Our
measure ranges from 6 (primary education) to 21 (PhD or doctorate) years. For a
meaningful interpretation of the intercept we subtracted the minimum number of
years (6). Additionally, we considered the possibility of a non-linear relationship
between educational attainment and radical right voting (cf. Evans, 2005;
Rydgren, 2007), including a squared term of the years of education. Alternatively,
we used a dummified measure of education, distinguishing ‘low’ (primary or
lower secondary education), ‘medium’ (upper or post secondary, non-tertiary
education) and ‘high’ (first or second stage of tertiary education) levels of
education.
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Explanatory mechanisms
To test our explanatory hypotheses on the relationship between educational
attainment and voting for the PVV, we used a set of theoretically derived
mediators. We selected items which are valid measurements of our mediators and
conducted several exploratory as well as confirmatory factor analyses in order to
reduce the number of factors and compose reliable scales of our explanatory
mechanisms. Using an iterative approach, we excluded items with low commu-
nalities (\.20) as well as double loadings (with factor loadings[ |.40| and D factor
loadings\.20). In our final factor solution (see Table A1, Appendix) all items
clearly load on single factors as we expected. However, eventually we had to
exclude three single items tapping into authoritarianism, social trust as well as
political trust, respectively as these items did not clearly refer to one single factor.
We will come back to this when discussing the operationalization of our
explanatory variables in detail below. We constructed Likert scales which were all
highly correlated with our factor scores (r[ .96). For all explanatory mechanisms
we applied mean substitution for respondents with missing values.7
We used three Likert items to tap into euroscepticism (see Table A1, Appendix),
for instance, ‘‘The European Union is a threat to Dutch culture’’ and ‘‘The
Netherlands should resign its membership from the European Union’’. All five-
point scales were anchored between ‘do not agree at all’ and ‘agree entirely’.8 We
calculated the mean score for respondents with valid answers on at least two items
(Cronbach’s a = .77).
Perceived ethnic threat is measured using seven Likert items as shown in
Table A1, Appendix, for instance, ‘‘I sometimes worry that my neighbourhood will
decline due to the arrival of ethnic minorities’’ and ‘‘The coming of ethnic
minorities to the Netherlands is a threat to our own culture’’. Our final scale is
based on mean scores for respondents with valid answers on at least four items
(Cronbach’s a = .84).
Anti-Muslim attitudes is measured by five items (see Table A1, Appendix), for
instance, ‘‘Muslims easily resort to violence to solve their problems’’ and ‘‘Muslim
husbands dominate their wives’’. For respondents with valid answers on at least
three items, mean scores were calculated (Cronbach’s a = .80).
We used two items tapping into the respondents’ level of nationalistic attitudes:
‘‘I am proud to be a Dutchman’’ and ‘‘Every Dutchman ought to pay honour to our
national symbols like the national flag and the national anthem’’. Our final scale is
based on the mean score for respondents with at least one valid answer on both
items (Cronbach’s a = .58).
The results of our factor analyses (Table A1, Appendix) indicated that our
measures of relative deprivation refer to two dimensions, i.e., present relative
deprivation and future economic decline. The respondents’ present relative
deprivation is measured using three items, for instance, ‘‘I am having difficulties
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buying necessary things from my salary’’ and ‘‘I am very unsatisfied with my
present income’’. We calculated the mean score for respondents with valid answers
on at least two items (Cronbach’s a = .66).
In addition, we also considered whether respondents expect to face future
economic decline, using three Likert items (see Table A1, Appendix), for instance,
‘‘I think I will be able to afford less coming years’’ and ‘‘I think I will have to adjust
my present lifestyle in coming years’’. For respondents with valid answers on at
least two items, mean scores were calculated (Cronbach’s a = .84).
For our remaining three attitudinal explanatory variables, our (single item)
measures did not clearly load on a single factor. Hence, we constructed scales based
on single items and tested whether these variables are strongly correlated with the
other attitudinal variables, which is not the case (see Table A2, Appendix). The
respondents’ level of social trust was measured by the following item: ‘‘I think
most people are honest and trustworthy’’.
Our measure of political trust refers to trust in Dutch politics and is measured by
the following item: ‘‘Please tell me on a score from 0 to 10 how much you trust the
Dutch parliament’’. A higher score refers to more political trust.
We used the following Likert item to tap into the respondents’ authoritarian
attitudes: ‘‘What we need are less laws and less institutions, and more courageous,
indefatigable, and devoted leaders, in whom the people can put their faith’’.
Also, we considered two behavioural explanatory mechanisms, which are not
included in the factor analyses mentioned earlier. Our measure of interethnic
contact is based on three dichotomous items asking respondents whether they have
one or more friends from (i) Turkish, (ii) Moroccan or (iii) Surinamese/Antillean
descent. Respondents who indicated to have friends belonging to at least one of
these minority groups were coded as having interethnic contact. Note, that this
measure refers to contact with non-Western minorities, which is most likely to
influence radical right voting.9
Associational involvement was measured by asking respondents of how many
associations (e.g., sports clubs, voluntary organizations, or a band or choir) they are
a member. As only a small percentage (6.3 per cent) of the respondents was
involved in more than three organizations, we decided to combine these
respondents with those who stated to be involved in three different organizations
(8.2 per cent). Respondents with missing values on this item (9.5 per cent) were
treated as being not involved in any kind of organization.10
Control variables
We controlled for several known predictors of radical right voting and our
explanatory mechanisms. We included age measured in years. For a meaningful
interpretation of the intercept we subtracted the minimum age (18). Gender is
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included with males as reference category. Religiosity is measured by the
frequency of the respondents’ church attendance, distinguishing ‘never or hardly
ever’ (reference category), ‘less than once a month’ and ‘once a month or more’.
Marital status is included with the categories ‘not married’ (reference category),
‘married’ and ‘divorced/widowed’.11 We also considered the occupational status of
respondents. For employed respondents, we used the ISEI score to distinguish three
categories: ‘occupational status low’ (ISEI\ 35), ‘occupational status medium’
(35 B ISEI\ 60) and ‘occupational status high’ (60\ ISEI; reference category).
For respondents with missing information on their occupational status or
respondents without paid employment (e.g., students, homemakers, pensioners or
unemployed) we included an additional category (‘occupational status other’).
Finally, the respondents’ region is included as this partly taps into the level of
urbanization of the living environment as well as the presence of ethnic minorities
in the respondents’ surrounding. The following categories are distinguished: ‘north’
(reference), ‘west’, ‘east’, ‘south’ as well as two additional categories for ‘large
cities’ and ‘suburban district’. For descriptive statistics of our (in)dependent
variables, mediators and controls, we refer to Table A3 (Appendix).
Analyses
We tested our hypotheses in multiple steps. First, we conducted a logistic
regression analysis to test our first hypothesis on the relationship between
educational attainment and radical right voting (Table 1), considering both linear
relationships as well as deviations from linearity. Next, we considered the
relationship between educational attainment and all mediators subsequently and
separately (Table 1). This reflects the first part of hypotheses 2–11, denoted as (a).
We conducted several OLS regression analyses, except for the relationship between
education and our dichotomous measure of interethnic contact, for which we
applied logistic regression analyses.
Subsequently, we considered the influence of our mediating variables on the
likelihood to vote for the PVV (Table 2), reflecting the second part of hypotheses
2–11, denoted as (b). We conducted several logistic regression analyses taking into
account our mediating variables separately (Models 2–12), as well as simultane-
ously (Model 13). These steps provide a first indication of whether the influence of
educational attainment on radical right voting is (partly) explained by our
mediators. As a final step, we used Preacher and Hayes’ indirect macro (Preacher
and Hayes, 2008) to test whether the indirect relationships between educational
attainment and radical right voting via our mediators are significant. Using
bootstrapping, this macro calculates indirect effects and gives an indication of the
significance of these effects.
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Results
We start with the influence of educational attainment on the odds of radical right
voting. The results of our logistic regression analysis (Table 1) show that people with
a higher level of educational attainment (in years) are less likely to vote for the PVV
(b = -.268; Exp(b) = .766). This is in line with our expectation that lower educated
people are overrepresented among the electorate of the PVV (hypothesis 1).
As some earlier studies (e.g., Evans, 2005; Rydgren, 2007) pointed at the
possibility of a non-linear relationship between educational attainment and radical
right voting, we additionally included a squared term of educational attainment in
years, while we used a dummified measure of educational attainment in a separate
analysis (results available upon request). In both cases we found no support for a
non-linear nature of this relationship.12 This means that an important prerequisite
for testing our explanatory hypotheses is in place, as all hypotheses predict a
negative relationship between educational attainment and voting for the PVV.
To test our explanatory hypotheses, we first considered the relationships between
our independent variable (educational attainment) and all mediators separately
(Table 1). We started with interethnic contact which we expected to play a role as
proposed by intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011). Contradictory
to our expectations, the odds to have friends from non-Western decent turned out
not to be influenced by people’s level of educational attainment (hypothesis 2a).
We reached similar conclusions using an alternative measure of frequency of
interethnic contact (results available upon request).
Next, we considered the role of associational involvement and social trust. In line
with our expectations (hypotheses 3a and 4a) higher educated people are more
involved in voluntary associations (b = .108) and have more social trust
(b = .068). We likewise found support for our hypothesis on euroscepticism
(hypothesis 5a), as higher educated people turned out to be less eurosceptic
(b = -.068).
Also most of our more established explanations are related with educational
attainment as we expected. Higher educated people perceive less ethnic threat
(b = -.069; hypothesis 6a), display lower levels of anti-Muslim attitudes
(b = -.064; hypothesis 7a) and hold less nationalistic attitudes (b = -.030;
hypothesis 8a). Moreover, higher educated natives turned out to be less in favour of
authoritarian attitudes (b = -.090) as compared to lower educated people,
supporting hypothesis 9a. We also tested the influence of relative deprivation. As
we expected (hypothesis 10a), people with more formal education display less
relative deprivation in their current situation (b = -.066) and expect fewer
economic decline in the future (b = -.050). Finally, also political trust was
influenced by educational attainment as we hypothesized, as higher educated
people have more political trust (b = .120; hypothesis 11a).
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Our results indicate that people’s level of educational attainment is related to our
mediators in the expected direction for all explanatory mechanisms, except for
interethnic contact. This means that, at this point, we can rule out interethnic
contact as an explanation for the negative relationship between educational
attainment and voting for the PVV.
In a second step, we tested whether our explanatory mechanisms influence
people’s odds to vote for the PVV (Table 2). We started with our model without our
mediators (Table 2, Model 1), which corresponds with the first model in Table 1.
Next, we included our mediators one by one (Table 2, Models 2–12). Contradictory
to our expectations, having friends belonging to a non-Western ethnic minority group
does not influence people’s odds to cast their vote for the PVV. Although the effect is
in the expected direction, it does not reach significance which means that we have to
refute hypothesis 2b. Note, that we reached similar conclusions if we used our
measure of contact frequency (results available upon request). Interethnic contact
(i.e., a lack thereof) can, thus, not be an explanation for the overrepresentation of
lower educated people among the electorate of the PVV, as people’s level of
educational attainment does not influence their likelihood to have interethnic contact
and having such contact is unrelated with radical right voting.
The influences of associational involvement (hypothesis 3b) and social trust
(hypothesis 4b) are in the expected direction: the more people are involved in
voluntary organizations (b = -.305; Exp(b) = .737) and the higher their level of
social trust (b = -.371; Exp(b) = .690) the less likely they are to vote for the
PVV. Also euroscepticism seems to be a relevant determinant of radical right
voting (Table 2, Model 5). People who are more eurosceptic, are more likely to
vote for the PVV (b = .393; Exp(b) = 1.481; hypothesis 5b). In addition, we found
that higher levels of perceived ethnic threat (b = 1.395; Exp(b) = 4.035;
hypothesis 6b), anti-Muslim attitudes (b = 1.354; Exp(b) = 3.873; hypothesis
7b) and nationalistic attitudes (b = .415; Exp(b) = 1.514; hypothesis 8b) increase
people’s likelihood to vote for the PVV.
Next, we considered the influence of authoritarianism (Table 2, Model 9). As we
expected (hypothesis 9b) people who are more in favour of authoritarian attitudes
have a higher odds to vote for the PVV (b = .566; Exp(b) = 1.761). Also the
influence of people’s relative deprivation (Table 2, Models 10 and 11) is in line
with our expectation (hypothesis 10b): people who face more deprivation in their
current situation (b = .305; Exp(b) = 1.357) or expect their economic situation to
decline in the future (b = .249; Exp(b) = 1.283) are more likely to vote for the
PVV. Note, however, that both effects are only marginally significant. Political
trust cannot explain the overrepresentation of lower educated people among the
electorate of the PVV: the influence of political trust (Table 2, Model 12) is in the
expected direction, though, does not reach the boundary of significance. Hence, we
have to reject hypothesis 11b. Although most explanatory mechanisms turn out to
be related with radical right voting in the expected direction, at this point we can
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rule out interethnic contact and political trust as explanations for the negative
relationship between educational attainment and radical right voting.
Next, we included all (significant) mediators simultaneously in our model
(Table 2, Model 13) to conduct a stricter test and rule out any possible spurious
relationships. Indeed, several influences of our mediators found earlier, seem to be
spurious and are no longer significant, once we take into account our alternative
explanations. As shown in Model 13, only three explanatory mechanisms turned
out to explain radical right voting: people with higher levels of ethnic threat
perceptions (b = .965; Exp(b) = 2.625), anti-Muslim attitudes (b = .648;
Exp(b) = 1.912) and authoritarian attitudes (b = .329; Exp(b) = 1.390) are more
likely to vote for the PVV. Of our large set of theoretically derived explanations for
the negative relationship between educational attainment and radical right voting,
only three explanatory mechanisms seem to be relevant. At first sight, perceived
ethnic threat appears to be the most important factor, as this effect is highly
significant. Note, that the influence of educational attainment (b = -.127;
Exp(b) = .881) on radical right voting decreases and is only marginally significant
(p\ .10), once we take into account our explanatory mechanisms (compare Model
1 and Model 13).13
Finally, we applied Preacher and Hayes’ indirect macro (Preacher and Hayes,
2008) to test whether the indirect relationships between educational attainment and
radical right voting via our mediators are significant. Based on bootstrapping, only
the indirect effect of educational attainment via perceptions of ethnic threat on
radical right voting turned out to be significant (results available upon request).
This underlines our earlier conclusion about the importance of ethnic threat
perceptions, based on the final model in Table 2.14
Conclusions and Discussion
The importance of education, next to social class, for determining people’s political
preferences and voting behaviour has been emphasized already by Lipset in the
1960s (Lipset, 1981 [1960]). In this study, we addressed the relationship between
educational attainment and voting for radical right parties; a party family that has
gained much success during the past decades in many Western European countries
(Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). We focused on the Netherlands and were
interested in the influence of education on voting for the Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV), which is considered a radical right party with a strong anti-immigrant and
anti-Muslim stance (e.g., ECRI, 2008; Hooghe et al, 2010).
Generally, research shows that lower educated people are overrepresented
among the electorate of radical right parties (e.g., Kessler and Freeman, 2005;
Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013), although others pointed at a curvilinear
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relationship (e.g., Evans, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) or did not find a
relationship at all (Norris, 2005). In line with the vast majority of European studies
(e.g., Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013) as well as earlier
findings in the Netherlands (Van Gent et al, 2014), our results showed that the more
years of formal education people have, the lower their odds to vote for the PVV.
We did not find support for a curvilinear relationship.
In this study, we were particularly interested in explaining the relationship
between educational attainment and radical right voting. Based on previous
theoretical explanations and consistent empirical findings, we selected a large set of
explanatory mechanisms to gain more insight in why lower educated people would
be more likely to vote for radical right parties. Unlike many earlier studies, we were
able to consider a large set of explanatory mechanisms simultaneously. This
enabled us to conduct a more systematic and strict test of these underlying
explanations, i.e., mediators, ruling out spurious relationships and eventually
assessing crucial determinants of radical right voting.
Our findings underline the importance of this design. Considering the influence of
our explanatory mechanisms separately, many relationships were in line with our
expectations: lower educated people turned out to be, for instance, more eurosceptic
(cf. Hakhverdian et al, 2013), which was positively related with voting for the PVV
(cf. Ivarsflaten, 2005). Moreover, lower educated people were less involved in
voluntary organizations (cf. Putnam, 1995; Wilson, 2000) and held lower levels of
social trust (cf. Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), which, in turn, was negatively related
with radical right voting (cf. Billiet and De Witte, 2001; Coffe´, 2002; Norris, 2005).
Once we considered our explanatory mechanisms simultaneously, however, these
influences turned out to be spurious and no longer reached significance.
Ruling out such spurious relationships, three mechanisms turned out to be
important to explain the relationship between educational attainment and voting for
the PVV: authoritarian attitudes, perceptions of ethnic threat and anti-Muslim
attitudes. Apparently, these political stances are more important than explanations
focusing on a lack of societal connectedness (in terms of associational involvement
and interethnic contact). The first explanation referring to authoritarian attitudes is
based on the idea that the socio-economic position of the lower strata is
characterized by poverty and deprivation which induces frustration and anxiety
(Adorno et al, 1950). Consequently, lower educated people are likely to submit
themselves to strong authorities and conventional norms and values. These
psychological needs are served by radical right parties which emphasize traditional
norms and a strong leader (Mudde, 2007). Our results clearly show that lower
educated natives are more in favour of authoritarian attitudes (cf. Adorno et al,
1950; Gabennesch, 1972), which, in turn, is positively related with radical right
voting (cf. Mayer and Perrineau, 1992; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000). However,
additional analyses using bootstrapping did not lend support for an indirect effect
of educational attainment on voting for the PVV via authoritarian attitudes.
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Both other explanatory mechanisms are derived from realistic group conflict
theory (Coser, 1956; Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999) and ethnic competition theory
(Scheepers et al, 2002; Coenders et al, 2004) and neatly link with the profile of the
radical right party family. Radical right parties generally ‘‘[…] share an emphasis
on ethno-nationalism’’ and focus on ‘‘[…] strengthening the nation by making it
more ethnically homogeneous’’ (Rydgren, 2007, p. 242). The PVV has an
ethnocentric agenda and resorts to a racist and xenophobic discourse, targeting
particularly Muslim communities (ECRI, 2008). In line with our expectations,
lower educated people turned out to perceive more ethnic threat and hold more
negative attitudes toward Muslims, driving them to vote for the PVV. In particular
perceptions of ethnic threat seem to be important, as additional analyses based on
bootstrapping revealed that the relationship between educational attainment and
radical right voting is only mediated by this mechanism.
Given the PVV’s focus on anti-immigrant issues as their core message, it is
remarkable that interethnic contact did not play a role. So far, empirical evidence
for the role of interethnic contact is scarce. Whereas Green et al (2016) found
support for the influence of interethnic contact on radical right voting in
Switzerland, Rydgren (2008) found no support in four out of six European
countries (including The Netherlands). Using a more strict measurement of
interethnic contact referring to non-Western minorities, our results are in line with
Rydgren’s outcome for the Netherlands. Future research could use a cross-national
perspective to further disentangle whether and why the impact of interethnic
contact varies across countries, improving our understanding of the mechanisms
behind. Additionally, focusing on interethnic contact in different domains (e.g., in
the neighbourhood or at the workplace) and with different minority groups (e.g.,
immigrants from Eastern Europe) might provide fruitful alleys for future research.
Finally, there are some limitations to this study which should be acknowledged.
First, as discussed before, our theoretical model explaining why lower educated
people are overrepresented among the electorate of radical right parties is probably
more complex than presented in this study as several mechanisms themselves might
be interrelated as well. Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we were unable
to further disentangle the interrelatedness and causal orders of these theoretical
mechanisms. Taking into account our large set of explanations simultaneously, we
were, however, able to conduct a strict test revealing the most crucial mechanisms
explaining why lower educated people are more in favour of the radical right.
Future research should, preferably using longitudinal panel data, address the causal
orders of these mechanisms more profoundly.
Second, future research could further explore alternative explanations for the
negative relationship between educational attainment and radical right voting.
Although we uniquely tested a large set of explanations simultaneously, other
explanations, like attachment to traditions, subjective perceptions of crime or crime
policy preferences (e.g., Dinas and Van Spanje, 2011; Werts et al, 2012), could also
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be examined. Apart from having access to (preferably multi-item) measures of such
explanatory mechanisms, these mediators have to be related to both educational
attainment and radical right voting in such a way that they can account for a negative
relationship. Although the selection of mediators in this study was guided by these
principles, we cannot rule out the possibility of even more alternative explanations.
Nevertheless, given our strict test of mediators, we are quite confident that perceived
ethnic threat is one of the central (if not the most important) explanations for the
overrepresentation of lower educated people among the electorate of the PVV.
To conclude, this study underlines the importance of considering alternative
explanations for the relationship between education and radical right voting
simultaneously, in order to preclude spurious relationships. Our results show that
the overrepresentation of lower educated people among the electorate of the PVV is
mainly driven by perceptions of ethnic threat, ruling out many other theoretically
well-established explanations. As such, the PVV’s emphasis on the economic and
cultural threats the immigrants would pose to the Dutch society, seems to bear fruit
in terms of mobilizing lower educated people among the Dutch electorate.
About the Authors
Michael Savelkoul is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at
Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. His main research interests
include ethnic diversity, social cohesion and radical right voting. His work has
appeared among others in European Sociological Review, Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly and Social Science Research.
Peer Scheepers is professor of comparative methodology in the Department of
Sociology at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He is interested in
cross-national research on social cohesion issues.
Notes
1 Kitschelt (2007) argued that not finding a relationship between educational attainment and radical
right voting might be the consequence of taking into account measures of occupational status,
indirectly tracking educational attainment. Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013) showed, however, that
education has an effect on radical right voting even if one considers the influence of occupational
class.
2 For more information on both expert surveys, see Hooghe et al (2010) and Immerzeel et al (2011).
3 As some scholars pointed at a curvilinear relationship, arguing that in particular the mid-school
stratum is most likely to vote for radical right parties (Evans, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006;
Rydgren, 2007), we will additionally test whether this also holds for the Netherlands.
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4 The overall response rate is 54.6 per cent which is in line with similar Dutch surveys. Although
deviations from representativeness were relatively small, men, people living in strongly urbanized
areas as well as the youngest and oldest age groups were slightly underrepresented (see Eisinga et al,
2012). As we are interested, however, in relationships between educational attainment, explanatory
mechanisms and radical right voting, this is not problematic.
5 If we exclude respondents who stated not to vote if general elections were held (4.9 per cent), we
reach substantially similar findings (results are available upon request).
6 If we exclude respondents who indicated that they would not vote, this percentage slightly increases
(8.9 per cent).
7 The percentage of respondents with missing values on our explanatory mechanisms ranges from .2
per cent for social trust to 12.9 per cent for our scale of euroscepticism. Robustness analyses,
excluding these respondents, yield substantially similar conclusions (results available upon request).
8 Unless stated differently, this holds for all other items used to construct our mediating variables.
9 Using an alternative measure of interethnic contact, based on three items referring to the frequency of
neighbourhood contact with (i) Turks, (ii) Moroccans or (iii) Surinamese/Antilleans, we reach similar
conclusions (results available upon request).
10 Excluding respondents with missing values or using a dichotomous measure of associational
involvement leads to substantially similar findings (results available upon request).
11 Respondents with missing values on this item (.7 per cent) were included in the reference category.
12 As the direct effect of education on radical right voting might be partly mediated by the respondents’
occupational status (Kitschelt, 2007), we additionally excluded our measure of occupational status
and considered whether the influence of educational attainment differs and becomes non-linear. We
reach, however, similar conclusions as compared to our full model including the respondents’
occupational status (results available upon request).
13 Caution should be exercised when comparing parameter estimates across non-linear regression
models with different independent variables, as including different variables might influence the
level of unobserved heterogeneity and consequently the scale of the dependent variable (Mood,
2010). However, as a reduction of the level of unobserved heterogeneity leads to larger effect terms,
we can rule out that a downward change of the effect term (e.g., of educational attainment) is caused
by a change of scale. One should bear in mind, though, that the shrinkage of the coefficient might
have been even larger if there was no change of scale.
14 Our scale of perceived ethnic threat is measured more reliably as compared to some other
explanatory mechanisms based on single items rather than multiple items. As multi-item scales are
more reliable, they suffer less from measurement error which should result in greater effect sizes.
Therefore, we tested whether our eventual finding is caused by a more reliable measurement of our
threat scale. We conducted additional analyses (results available upon request) using only the first
item of our threat scale (see Table A1, Appendix), loading most strongly on the factor tapping into
ethnic threat perceptions. In that case, we reach substantially similar conclusions as presented in
Tables 1 and 2. Using Preacher and Hayes’ indirect macro (Preacher and Hayes, 2008), the indirect
effects of educational attainment via anti-Muslim attitudes and authoritarian attitudes become
significant as well.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics (N = 774)
Range Mean/per cent Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
Radical right voting (voting for the PVV) 0/1 8.40 per cent
Independent variable
Educational attainment (years) (6 = 0) 0–15 6.45 2.85
Mediating variables
Interethnic contact 0/1 31.65 per cent
Associational involvement (# org.) 0–3 1.03 1.11
Social trust 0–4 2.41 0.78
Euroscepticism 0–4 1.52 0.74
Perceived ethnic threat 0–4 1.82 0.75
Anti-Muslim attitudes 0–4 2.44 0.69
Nationalistic attitudes 0–4 2.82 0.79
Authoritarian attitudes 0–4 2.48 1.12
Present relative deprivation 0–4 1.24 0.84
Future economic decline 0–4 2.16 0.99
Political trust 0–10 5.63 1.58
Controls
Age (18 = 0) 0–52 28.12 13.10
Gender
Male (ref.) 0/1 43.93 per cent
Female 0/1 56.07 per cent
Religiosity—church att. never/hardly ever (ref.) 0/1 56.07 per cent
Religiosity—church att. sometimes 0/1 26.10 per cent
Religiosity—church att. once a month or more 0/1 17.83 per cent
Marital status—not married (ref.) 0/1 29.20 per cent
Marital status—married 0/1 57.49 per cent
Marital status—divorced/widowed 0/1 13.31 per cent
Occupational status high (ref.) 0/1 14.34 per cent
Occupational status low 0/1 37.34 per cent
Occupational status mid 0/1 18.73 per cent
Occupational status other (unemployed/students etc.) 0/1 29.59 per cent
Region north (ref.) 0/1 24.29 per cent
Region large cities 0/1 5.30 per cent
Region west 0/1 25.06 per cent
Region east 0/1 15.25 per cent
Region south 0/1 27.00 per cent
Region suburban district 0/1 3.10 per cent
Source: Religion in Dutch Society (SOCON, 2011/2012).
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